Esports Money Map: From TI Peak to Middle East Era – Reallocation, Not Decline

They were champions. They won the most prestigious titles in their respective genres. And then, they crumbled or stood on the brink of bankruptcy. This is not a paradox, but the clearest signal of a profound restructuring in the global esports economy. 2026 witnessed two seemingly contradictory stories: Dplus KIA won the Esports World Cup (EWC) 2026 in League of Legends, yet just months earlier, the team had delayed salaries and desperately sought a new owner. Conversely, Falcons – the winner of The International (TI) 2026 in Dota 2 – announced its withdrawal from that very discipline immediately after claiming the crown, focusing instead on other games within the EWC ecosystem. "People call it meta; I call it digitized fear" – the fear here stems not from in-game patch changes, but from money flows shifting direction.

Context: The Collapse of the Prize Temple

The International was once the symbol of esports financial power. In 2026, its prize pool peaked at $40 million – an unimaginable figure for any esports event. In 2026, it dropped to $18.9 million. By 2026, it was only about $3.4 million. And most recently, TI has been in the low millions, representing a decline of over 91% from its peak just three years prior. The direct cause was Valve's decision to change the Battle Pass mechanism, severing the link between in-game item sales and prize pool. Valve pulled the plug on the money-printing machine called "crowdfunding." But this does not mean esports is dying. Rather, money is being pumped into a completely different system.

While TI shrank, the Esports World Cup 2026 emerged with a total prize pool of $75 million, spanning dozens of titles. The Saudi eLeague 2026 also announced a prize pool of over 4 million Saudi Riyal (approximately $1.07 million) for 37 participating clubs. The massive capital influx from Saudi Arabia is reshaping the financial landscape. This is not a recession; this is a reallocation – a shift from a "community-funded prize model" to a "sponsor-and-state-backed model."

Case Study: Dplus KIA – Winning Does Not Equal Sustainability

Dplus KIA (DK) is one of Korea's top organizations, inheriting the legacy of DAMWON Gaming, the 2026 World Champion. In 2026, they won the EWC League of Legends championship, defeating the world's best. However, the backstage story was much gloomier. Before the tournament, DK had to delay salary payments to players and staff due to cash flow difficulties. Their League of Legends roster cost about 3 billion Korean Won (approximately $2.3 million) – a huge sum in a context where revenue was not keeping pace.

Why could a championship team be cash-strapped? Because titles do not automatically bring profit. In the old system, tournament prize money was a primary income source for many teams. But as TI shrank and other tournaments lacked large enough prize funds, that income stream dried up. Sponsors still came, but they demanded higher media value, and not every team could deliver. DK's search for a new owner is a clear signal: even a championship team cannot sustain itself if its cost structure – especially player salaries – grows faster than revenue.

The truth is, during the boom period, player salaries skyrocketed, but revenue from media rights, sponsorship, and merchandise did not keep up. The result was a dangerous gap. Dplus KIA, despite winning, fell into a "cost trap," turning what should have been an asset – a championship roster – into a burden when cash flow was insufficient to maintain it.

Case Study: Falcons – Withdrawing to Optimize

Falcons did what few expected: immediately after winning The International 2026, they announced their departure from Dota 2. The official reason was "maintaining long-term sustainable operations," and they would "focus resources on other titles." This is not a retreat of weakness, but a strategic decision. Falcons participated in 18 tournaments at EWC 2026 – more than most other organizations. They chose to exit Dota 2 because it is an ecosystem shrinking in terms of prize money, while other games have better commercial potential and Saudi backing.

This indicates a shift in the mindset of top-tier esports organizations: no longer pursue titles at all costs, but optimize the portfolio. Falcons already had a TI victory; they didn't need to burn money to maintain a Dota 2 roster just to win more titles. Instead, they use those resources to dominate the multi-title EWC events, which offer larger prize pools and higher media attention. This is not an end, but a smart shift.

Contrarian View: "Esports Winter" is a Misguided Romanticization

Media often call this period "esports winter" due to seeing many teams disband and prize pools decline. But this is an incomplete perspective. In reality, the total amount of money flowing into esports has never decreased; it has only changed location and form. In 2026, EWC spent $75 million on prize pools alone – not counting organizational costs, sponsorship, and infrastructure investment. Saudi eLeague invested over 4 million Riyals for 37 clubs. Meanwhile, Korea's LCK implemented salary caps and luxury taxes to stabilize the labor market.

What is called a "recession" is actually a concentration of capital into major tournaments, commercially viable games, and organizations with sustainable operations. Teams that rely solely on tournament prize money and excessively high player salaries will die. But multi-title organizations that control costs and have good relationships with major sponsors will survive and thrive. This polarization is inevitable in a maturing industry.

Solution: Salary Cap and Sustainable Future

Korea's LCK pioneered the implementation of a salary cap combined with a luxury tax – a mechanism that both controls costs and redistributes resources among teams. This is a positive step toward ensuring fair competition and long-term financial health. Without this cap, wealthy teams would continue to drive up salaries, making it impossible for smaller teams to compete and eventually driving them out of the ecosystem. This has happened in many traditional sports, and esports is learning from that.

However, salary caps are not a silver bullet. They need to be accompanied by other sustainable revenue sources: broadcast rights, long-term sponsorship, merchandise sales, and services. Organizations must also diversify their game portfolios to reduce the risk of dependence on a single title. Falcons is an example: they exited Dota 2 but continue to thrive in other games within the EWC framework.

Takeaway

Esports is not dying. It is simply changing its skin. Money flows from community-driven tournaments like TI are shifting to state-and-corporation-backed events like EWC. Organizations must adapt or disappear. Teams that once only signed huge contracts for players without a sustainable financial plan will be the first victims. But those that optimize their portfolios, control costs, and build strong brands will survive and prosper. A new era has begun. The question is: are Vietnamese esports organizations ready for this game? They need to look at the example of Falcons and the bitter lesson from Dplus KIA. The match starts when the coaching staff submits the roster, but the economic match started when?